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FREE SPEECH AND GOOD CHARACTER

Vincent Blasi
Early proponents of the freedom of speech such as John Milton, John Stuart
Mill, and Louis Brandeis emphasized the role expressive liberty plays in strengthening the characterof persons entrustedwith such freedom. These theorists argued
that charactertraits such as civic courage, independence of mind, and the capacity to learn from experience and adapt are nurtured by trusting citizens with
dangerous ideas. Today there is much talk about good character in relation to
free speech disputes-butall on the side of those who would regulate speakers. It
is time to remember that a concern about character cuts both ways in these
matters. Exactly how that is so is the subject of Professor Vincent Blasi's
Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, the most original writing on the First
Amendment has focused on the subtle and sometimes severe harms that
speech can cause.' This work gives the lie to what we were taught on the
playground: Who among us still believes that "sticks and stones will break
my bones but words will never hurt me"?
I do not intend here to challenge or revise or embellish the thesis that
speech hurts. Instead, I will address an old question that takes on greater
urgency the more we recognize the harms that words can accomplish: Just
how valuable is free speech after all? Hardly anyone fails to pay lip service
*
Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School, and David Lurton
Massee, Jr. Professor of Law and Hunton & Williams Research Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law. This Essay is adapted from the Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture, delivered
at the UCLA School of Law on March 16,1999.
1. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 61-73 (1986); CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Charles R. Lawrence I1l, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
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to the special significance of the liberty of thought and expression. However, as the price tag, computed in terms of perceived social costs, goes up,
many persons are beginning to wonder whether the benefits of free speech
have not been oversold. Why, as a general matter, should the freedom of
speech be treated as possibly our single most important political principle?
What accounts for its status as the virtual linchpin of our constitutional
culture? Unless we can answer that question convincingly for our own age,
we cannot justify the level of First Amendment protection that currently
obtains.
When pressed to defend the extraordinary emphasis accorded the freedom of speech in the United States-an emphasis not really replicated in
other liberal democracies--First Amendment devotees typically invoke one
or more of three basic rationales. First, the liberty to express one's thoughts
and to form them by unrestricted reading and listening is an essential
attribute, it is said, of human autonomy-of what it means to be a selfdirected person possessed of human dignity. Second, free speech is the
foundational mechanism of the search for truth, at both the individual and
the societal levels. In this regard, a free marketplace of ideas produces a
better, more nuanced and richly textured understanding of life than can any
prescribed orthodoxy. Third, for a society committed to the project of selfgovernment, in which ultimate political responsibility rests with the mass of
ordinary citizens, free speech is invaluable as a means of civic education and
participation.!
This trilogy of rationales is venerable, and there is much to be said for
each of them. But there are problems. Yes, we all like to think of ourselves
as autonomous, but how many of us possess even a rudimentary understanding of this profound, elusive Kantian notion? And if we did, would we
necessarily embrace its strong assumptions regarding human agency and also
conclude that speech is special among the liberties that sustain the self?
Yes, truth is important, but truth seeking is such a different activity for the
true believer, the pragmatist, and the sceptic as to confound any effort to
generalize regarding the priority to be accorded truth seeking, the role free
speech plays in facilitating it, and the significance of the many "market failures" that distort the flow of ideas and information. Yes, self-government is
a noble ideal and one with a textual mooring in the Constitution, but what
it means for citizens to give meaningful consent or to engage in meaningful
participation are the very questions that fuel the clash of modern political
2.

For excellent critical summaries of the traditional rationales for the freedom of speech,

see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-72 (1982), and Kent

Greenawalt, Free Speech Justificaions,89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
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philosophies. This phenomenon of radical disagreement emerging from the
shared commitment to self-government appears also at the level of First
Amendment doctrine: Consider the issue of campaign spending limits.
Moreover, the justification for free speech from self-government fails to
provide a reason to protect literature or scientific inquiry, an unsettling
prospect even for minimalists who can live with the exclusion of commercial advertising, workplace harassment, and hard-core pornography from
the ambit of First Amendment concern. In brief, the tired trilogy of conventional free speech justifications is at best incomplete, and at worst so
abstract and protean as to be of very limited intellectual or practical utility.
In light of these difficulties, it is odd that a somewhat different, and to
my mind less problematic, rationale for the freedom of speech has not
received more attention in recent times, particularly since it figured prominently during the first three hundred years of systematic writing in defense
of toleration. This is a special kind of argument from character that builds
from the claim that a culture that prizes and protects expressive liberty
nurtures in its members certain character traits such as inquisitiveness,
independence of judgment, distrust of authority, willingness to take initiative, perseverance, and the courage to confront evil. Such character traits
are valuable, so the argument goes, not for their intrinsic virtue but for their
instrumental contribution to collective well-being, social as well as political. This claim plausibly can be said to form the spine of each of the
renowned defenses of free speech produced by John Milton,3 John Stuart
Mill, 4 Oliver Wendell Holmes,' and Louis Brandeis.6 Yet today we pick up
on other features of those classic writings, usually by finding some way to
enlist their observations in the service of the familiar arguments for free
speech from autonomy, truth seeking, and self-government.
The marginalization of the argument from character is unfortunate for
several reasons. First, there is today much talk about the need for good
character-but not among the proponents of free speech. If character is to
figure more in contemporary political thought, as I think it will and should,
proponents of free expression must not concede the issue of character to the
authoritarians. Second, the objective of strengthening character provides a
good reason to protect nonpolitical as well as political speech, even when
the impact of such protection on the functioning of social institutions
3.
See JOHN MILTON, Areopagtica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716-49
(Merritt Y.Hughes ed., Odyssey Press 1957) (1644).
4.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 19-55 (Stefan Collini
ed., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1859).
5. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6.
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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remains the principal concern; in contrast, most rationales that derive from
the political role of speech are unsatisfying on account of their weak or
nonexistent implications for the freedom of nonpolitical expression. Third,
the soaring rhetoric of autonomy, truth seeking, and self-government has
permitted critics to charge that the free speech tradition is founded upon
ideals that are hopelessly out of reach, and upon assumptions regarding
human nature that are far too optimistic. Whether fairly or not, the conventional arguments for free speech can be made to appear ungrounded and
naive. The argument from the instrumental value of character assumes that
we are to a large degree products of our environment and that human
proclivities for sloth, conformity, and corruption are a constant threat to
collective well-being. In this regard, a focus on character would help to
liberate the idea of free speech from the Panglossian taint under which
it now labors. Finally, to add value the argument from character need not
provide a self-sufficient, comprehensive rationale for the freedom of speech;
it can work in combination with other instrumentalist justifications of
comparably discrete significance, such as the argument that free speech
is beneficial because it facilitates the acquisition of information by those
who would check abuses of authority. The autonomy, truth-seeking, and
self-government rationales tend to be more holistic and self-contained, and
in that respect less capable of making incremental contributions to the case
for free expression.
To defend the idea of free speech by reference to its impact on character, we must establish both that a regime of expressive liberty actually nurtures certain character traits and that collective well-being is indeed served
thereby. Some would contend that First Amendment protection weakens
character by discrediting the very notion of limits. In this view, the predominant character'ological effect of the freedom of speech is to encourage
stridency, impatience, ideological exhibitionism, cynicism, the manipulation of audiences, and verbal cruelty, among other excesses and pathologies.
I take this objection seriously but think it is best confronted later, after the
lineaments of the argument from character are sketched. I will return to
the subject of limits at the end of this lecture.
I should make clear at this point, however, that the argument I am
about to describe is meant to address only the question of why as a general
matter the freedom of speech deserves extraordinary emphasis in a liberal
society such as the United States. What a character-based rationale, which
in any event is not meant to stand alone, implies about the exact scope,
strength, and contours of the right of free speech is beyond my ken on this
occasion. I wish to 'emphasize this reservation. Lawyers are prone to want
theories to function as algorithms: good theory in, good doctrinal formula-
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tion or case resolution out. That kind of reductionism seldom advances
understanding. Many variables in addition to theoretical justifications should
figure in the construction of wise judicial doctrines and the just resolution
of cases. Thus, in the domain of First Amendment law, institutional concerns pertaining to the limitations of legal categorization and the censorial
predispositions of factfinders and enforcement officials properly loom large.
One cannot say what a greater emphasis on character implies about
obscenity law or. the protection of symbolic speech, for example, without
undertaking an institutionally and contextually sensitive inquiry that examines many considerations specific to those problems. First Amendment theory
is interesting and relevant, but its resolving power for particular legal
controversies should not be exaggerated or schematized. The welcome consequence of this lack of linear determinacy is that the argument from
character must be evaluated in its own terms, not as a means to generate
antecedently preferred outcomes.
I.

FREE SPEECH AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER

So what exactly are the character traits that are promoted by according
the protection of free speech an extremely high priority? The traits I have in
mind include those mentioned earlier: inquisitiveness, independence of judgment, distrust of authority, willingness to take initiative, perseverance, and
the courage to confront evil. Here we can add others: aversion to simplistic
accounts and solutions, capacity to act on one's convictions even in the
face of doubt and criticism, self-awareness, imagination, intellectual and
cultural empathy, resilience, temperamental receptivity to change,
tendency to view problems and events in a broad perspective, respect for
evidence. This is a character profile that is anything but vacuous. In the
matter of character, the First Amendment is not a big tent.
But how is character affected by a constitutional commitment? Is the
key what such a commitment says, or what it does? The passions that constitutional controversies evoke often have a lot to do with what the disputants take to be the symbolic stakes. To understand the impact of the First
Amendment, however, we do better to focus on material considerations.
A legal system influences character not so much by preaching or teaching tolerance as by exerting coercive authority to protect dissenters.7 The
7.

In this respect, among others, the argument advanced here differs from the most impor.

tant recent effort to integrate a concern about character into First Amendment analysis, that
developed by University of Michigan President Lee Bollinger in his fascinating book, The Tolerant
Society. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1. Bollinger's argument is limited to one crucial character
trait, the capacity to control the intolerance one necessarily must feel toward persons whose
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resulting environment, in which dissent is both an option and an
inescapable reality, is the principal source of the characterological effect, or
so I maintain. It would be wrong to discount entirely the prospect of
hortatory influence, but the environmental impact of free speech deserves
the greater emphasis.
The most important environmental consequence of protecting free
speech is the intellectual and moral pluralism, and thus disorder in a sense,
thereby engendered. In matters of belief, conventional structures of authority are weakened, rebellion is facilitated, closure is impaired. Persons who
live in a free speech regime are forced to cope with persistent, and frequently
intractable, differences of understanding. For most of us that is a painful
challenge, at least in the realms that matter to us most. Being made to take
account of such differences shapes our character.
For example, a person who cannot ignore the existence of understandings antithetical to her own must find some way to come to terms with her
views. Such a coming to terms can take a variety of forms: blindly digging
in, angry denigration of persons with different notions, self-doubt, a
deepening of conviction and enhanced awareness of the grounds for one's
beliefs, curiosity about the sources of disagreement, confusion, a redoubling
of proselytizing zeal, or a grudging and gradual weakening of certitude that
may lead eventually to a change of mind. Faced with perdurable difference,
many persons will run a gamut of responses over time. What is less likely to
ensue the more difference is salient is complacency about one's beliefs and
the stasis that complacency engenders. Simply by energizing the experience
of belief formation, a free speech regime's legitimation of difference can
nurture many of the positive character traits outlined above.
In addition to forcing persons to confront their differences of understanding, free speech influences the complex process by which authority is constituted. Few if any of us can do without authority. By requiring us to do without
inherited authority, unquestioned authority, unaccountable authority, unitary
authority, a free speech regime creates a salutary void. We fill that void by
creating other authoritative structures in our lives, ranging from institutions
founded on collective (and revocable) consent, to social norms enforced by
speech or conduct manifests beliefs that threaten individual or community identity. Bollinger
views the protection of free speech as a commitment that can teach us how to understand and
manage this pervasive, natural, morally worthy (in proportion) but often overflowing and selfdestructive impulse. The character traits that I believe are nurtured by a free speech culture are
numerous and various, extending far beyond the capacity to control the impulse to intolerance.
Those traits are nurtured, moreover, primarily by the experience of living in a vibrant, dynamic,
contentious society rather than by the pedagogic contribution of a legal norm of toleration. Despite
these differences, the debt my treatment of the subject owes to Bollinger's pathbreaking resurrection of the concern about character is considerable.
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social sanctions, to precommitments and other sources of self-discipline.
Perhaps one could label this process the exercise of autonomy, but it
matters, in terms of the role of character, that the emphasis is on the
creation of authority rather than the experience of choice or selfdetermination as an essential attribute of personhood.
A third way that a free speech regime helps to mold character is by
emboldening persons for whom orthodox understandings do not ring true.
In most societies, even those that celebrate free speech, despair is the
common lot of the dissenter. No doubt it can be intoxicating to act out
differences: Rebellion has intelligible psychological roots and a whiff of
romance as well. That should not obscure the point that for most of us,
most of the time, it is a discomforting and often threatening experience
to be out on a limb. Despite the real satisfactions of forbidden inquiry and
unvarnished self-expression, the path of pleasure more frequently lies in the
direction of going along. Despite the widespread perception that in modern
society too many people flaunt and exaggerate their differences, the more
common response still is to bury them. In many circumstances that is surely
the socially desirable outcome; it is hard to imagine a functional society
that was not replete with reticence and trimming. Precisely because the
burying of differences is such a pervasive and necessary practice, however,
the capacity to pursue differences when occasion demands serves a most
important social function.
A culture that protects and celebrates free speech can help to nurture
that capacity in several ways. The legitimation of dissent can reduce the
degree to which persons with unorthodox ideas are viewed as deserving of
ostracism or retaliation. Also, rallies, meetings, and publications can inform
dissenters that they are not so isolated, not so far on the margin, as they
might have assumed. Facilitating various experiences of solidarity is one of
the most consequential, because most energizing, functions of a free speech
regime. In addition, the spectacle of some persons standing up to authority
or convention or corruption or evil or mediocrity can enhance in others the
sense of duty to take enough responsibility for their convictions to act on
them.
Finally, a regime of free speech can help to develop character by
requiring those who would beat back bad ideas and contain evil demagogues
to pursue those worthy objectives in the most arduous way: engagement
rather than prohibition. The claim here is not that truth and justice will
always prevail in a fair marketplace of ideas. We will never have such a
marketplace, and truth and justice would not always prevail even if we did.
Rather, the notion is that the experience of confronting falsehood and evil
profoundly shapes the character of a person or a society, and that such an
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experience is short-circuited by censorship. In this view, the most dangerous ideas can be defeated only by strong persons, not by repressive laws. The
two are not, of course, mutually exclusive, but the disturbing tendency, illustrated by our recent efforts to control racism on college campuses, is to think
the day's work is done when the self-congratulatory code is enacted. The
passage of laws too often has the quality of a moral shortcut, and too often
diverts what could be honest, if stressful, exchanges that might actually
impact beliefs into shallow forensic contests over legal coverage. In denying
the moral shortcut, a free speech regime strengthens the character of its
citizens.
These are some of the ways that the protection of free speech can
promote certain character traits. We must next inquire why the flourishing
of those character traits might be thought to serve collective well-being.

II.

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER AND COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING

One benefit of free speech is its contribution to a system of checks and
balances. Broadly conceived, such a system includes not only the efforts of
different branches of the same government to keep each other in line, but
also intergovernmental checks on the abuse of authority in a federal system
(states checking the federal government and vice versa) and checking by
private citizens via: elections and less formal manifestations of public
sentiment. To do their work, all the various checking agents depend on information concerning what the potential abusers of authority are doing. Often
such checking agents rely heavily on the power of communication to mobilize resistance to any discovered abuses. In this regard, the freedom of
speech is a mechanism that facilitates the system of checks and balances.
That is not my concern here. Particularly for a process that entails
opposition to abuses by powerful actors, mechanisms and procedures cannot
be efficacious if the persons who must employ them lack certain demanding
personal qualities. Independence of mind is one of those qualities because
abuses usually can be rationalized, excused, or ignored by observers who are
temperamentally inclined not to question their inertia-driven perceptions
of regularity and good faith. For the same reason, general distrust of
authority is a functional attitude in this sphere. Another character trait of
particular significance for the checking process- is perseverance. Miscreant
officials seldom go quietly once their transgressions are brought to light.
Checking is work for persons who can endure counterattacks and speak
truth to power not once or twice but like a broken record. By the same
token, a populace accustomed to judging more on grounds of evidence than
preconception or loyalty, a populace not paralyzed by complexity or delay,
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is more likely to heed the whistleblower. To the extent that the experience
of living in a robust, unruly free speech culture nurtures these various
aspects of character, the First Amendment has instrumental value for the
checking process quite apart from the mechanisms of communication it
provides.
Character serves collective well-being in many ways other than by
helping to control abuses of power. One is by facilitating compromise.
Institutions ranging from democratic governments to marriages flourish or fail
depending on how skillful participants are at the difficult art of compromise.
To a large degree, the capacity to compromise depends on character. A free
speech culture can help to foster some of the attitudes, skills, and even norms
that successful compromise requires. This is important because when persons
negotiate their differences poorly, becoming in the event manipulative or
resentful or disengaged, collective well-being is not advanced. In addition to
the costly side effects of such attitudes, compromises struck in their shadow
are likely to be unstable.
Persons who live in a society suffused with conflicting opinions ought
on that account to be more skillful at compromise. No doubt overheated
rhetoric can fuel resentments and foster political aggression, but not so
much, I would argue, as censorship can with the fantasies of purification
and domination it encourages. Frustration with the blind, stubborn resistance of those who refuse to see matters our way will always be a major
source of human unhappiness. The more that frustration is chronic, endemic
to the very texture of social life, the better chance we have of learning to
function in the face of it.
Free speech engenders fears but also hopes, and compromise is built on
hopes. It is easier to stay engaged, to find value in that half a loaf, if tomorrow may bring change for the better. Similarly, the capacity to compromise
frequently depends on the self-confidence and sense of perspective of those
who are asked to settle for less. Persons whose identities have been forged
by experiences of doubt, challenge, and choice are more likely to possess
the self-awareness and perspective that compromise demands.
Probably the single most important way that free speech serves collective well-being is by helping persons and institutions adapt to a changing
world. As with checking, adaptation depends on mechanisms of communication but even more on the character of the populace. And as various
forces such as technological advances and demographic developments cause
the pace of change to accelerate, this process of adaptation looms larger and
larger as an ingredient of well-being.
Adaptation begins with awareness. When prevailing ideas and arrangements cease to work well in an altered environment, the common tendency is
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to ignore or minimize the phenomenon. A society that encourages questioning, auditing, experimenting, and revising is more likely to notice problems generated by changing conditions.
At least as crucial to the process of adaptation is a temperamental
receptivity to change. A free speech culture weakens attachments to existing
patterns by ventilating alternatives and increasing public awareness of
changes that are already afoot. The sheer proliferation of perspectives in
play all but forces individuals caught in the maelstrom to adopt a dynamic
frame of reference.
Awareness of change, even receptivity to it, does not necessarily
engender productive adaptation, however. Good judgment is required for a
person or institution to determine how to thrive in uncharted terrain.
Heavy reliance on tradition or authority is maladaptive in a rapidly changing
environment. What is needed is perceptiveness, boldness, independence of
mind, willingness to experiment, flexibility-in short the capacity to make
choices. Passivity and avoidance are the vices to be feared.
Whatever else the freedom of speech does or does not do, it asks its practitioners, speakers and listeners alike, continuously to choose: what to say,
how to say it, whom to address, which speakers and messages to hear, what
to believe. The more experienced persons are at making choices of this
sort, the better their choices ought to be.
Unless, of course, too much choosing leads to decisional anomie. Successful adaptation requires not just the willingness to choose but the discipline to care about the wisdom of one's choices. Critics of what they take
to be the ascendent consumerist culture of ideas worry that the celebration
of free speech ends up being a celebration of destructively casual attitudes
toward knowledge and belief. Surely there is something to this critique.
Persons who feel overwhelmed by the choices with which they are confronted cannot be expected to stay engaged and retain perspective. Under
such conditions, impulses will reign and adaptation will suffer.
The crucial question is whether a strong constitutional commitment to
free speech fosters or forestalls this dangerous phenomenon of disorientation in the face of choice. Were it possible effectively to shield persons
from the riot of choices thrown up by the conditions of modern life, were it
possible to legislate simplicity and stability, we might well conclude that
censorship is the cure for disorientation. But such shielding is not possible,
at least not in a political community as large, demographically diverse and
mobile, and economically dynamic as the United States. The complexity of
the choices we face transcends any particular policy regarding free speech.
And if we cannot help but choose, far better that we be shielded from
susceptibility to simplistic perceptions and expectations. Although dema-
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gogues enabled by toleration can and do peddle simple-minded nostrums,
the net effect of a robust free speech tradition, I submit, is to make audiences more familiar and comfortable with complexity and thereby more
sceptical of such nostrums. To the extent that is true, the supremely important objective of productive adaptation is served.
In addition to receptivity to change and good judgment regarding how
to cope with it, an adaptive society needs creative ideas. Admittedly, the
wellsprings of creativity are elusive; geniuses certainly have emerged in
repressive regimes. Nevertheless, by tolerating unorthodox opinions and
inquiries a community encourages creativity both by valuing it and by enabling creative persons to achieve visibility and interact. A free speech tradition appears to matter especially at what might be termed the second
level of original thought, not that of rare geniuses with gifts and wills so
profound as to overwhelm their environments, but among the foot soldiers
of creative adaptation, the persons who diagnose and tinker and test and
guess and implement. Such persons shape a culture and are in turn shaped
by it. A vibrant culture of ideas can nurture the talents of such persons.
Checking, compromise, and adaptation are collective endeavors that
contribute to well-being across a wide spectrum of political arrangements.
When sovereignty resides in the people, however, as in a representative
democracy, additional capacities that can be developed and sustained by
free speech assume special importance. Among the most significant are the
willingness of ordinary citizens to participate in collective projects, to
assume some measure of responsibility for social outcomes, and more generally to maintain collective energy, resilience, and aspiration.
One way that a free speech tradition fosters such capacities is by instituting an ethic of distrust and critique of all institutions, not least of government. Critique presupposes responsibility and concern. An effective
critic participates in civic life and provokes others to do so. A high level of
accountability can energize both the sources and the targets of critical scrutiny.
As with adaptation, however, the social psychology of civic participation is complicated, contestable, and resistant to meaningful empirical
verification. Promiscuous distrust and critique could lead to cynical disengagement from collective endeavors, the postmodem equivalent of medieval
quietism. Why should we believe that pervasive and telling criticism
of established institutions engenders more engagement than withdrawal? It is
those very institutions, after all, that serve for most persons as the predominant forums for civic participation. Loyalty to and trust in civic
institutions may provide a necessary foundation for personal commitment.
Given our current point in the cycles of the public mood, we naturally
tend to associate free speech with rampant negativism, if not nihilism. And
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surely in any age disenchantment is one of the consequences of the
unremitting scrutiny of institutions. But systematic critique carries also an
implicit message of hope-hope that standards of performance continue
to obtain, hope that reform is possible. Otherwise, why bother? Institutions,
like persons, are respected more when much is demanded of them than
when they are indulged or ignored, and that holds true even when the
demands are in some sense unreasonable. Moreover, the very act of participating in the practice of institutional critique, if only as a listener,
connects the ordinary citizen with the collective endeavors that constitute
public life. That connection is both contingent and crucial to individual
and collective well-being. Loyalty and trust, the preconditions for civic
engagement, flow more from connectedness than from innocence.
Connectedness, responsibility, hope-these are vital ingredients of
civic participation that a commitment to free speech can help to sustain.
At least as important to the maintenance of political energy are two virtues
that typically do not receive the emphasis they deserve: perseverance and
resilience. To bring about reforms, it is almost always necessary to keep
knocking on the door, over and over again, refusing to take no for an
answer. To preserve hard-won gains, it is almost always necessary to ride
out storms of defeated expectations and consequent disillusionment. Staying power is the linchpin of efficacious civic participation. This is all the
more true in a culture buffeted by multifarious forces that serve to shorten
the individual and institutional attention span.
The relationship between free speech and the civic virtues of perseverance and resilience is as difficult to pin down as it is significant. On the
one hand, we might fear that too much free thinking and toleration contributes to the erosion of shared standards of judgment. If so, the capacity
to stay committed may be adversely affected. Citizens fighting only for
their "preferences" may not be as fiercely determined and thereby as capable
of enduring the slings and arrows of outrageous resistance as persons whose
civic participation is motivated by notions of honor, fundamental justice,
or divinely ordained (or natural) entitlement. In this view, free speech complicates perceptions, complexity sows the seeds of doubt, and doubt weakens
the will, all to the detriment of staying power.
On the other hand, one might believe, as I do, that naivet6 is the most
important characteristic of quitters. Persons who have scant experience
negotiating ideological and cultural differences, who manage to insulate
themselves from all but kindred spirits, are the civic actors most likely to
harbor unrealistic expectations and to wilt when those expectations are
defeated. In this view, perseverance flows from experience and perspective.
Whatever its relationship to autonomy, truth seeking, or fair representa-
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tion, a free speech tradition cannot help but broaden horizons and reduce
naivet6. If perseverance and resilience are as integral to civic well-being as
I think they are, that effect should count heavily in any assessment of the
benefits of free expression.
IIl.

THE QUESTION OF LIMITS

So far I have concentrated on the affirmative side of the equation. I
have examined the various ways that the protection of free speech can serve
collective well-being via characterological effects. A sceptic could grant
the claims I have put forward in this regard and still conclude that, on balance, a robust free speech principle disserves collective well-being precisely
because of its impact on character. For a culture of free speech may be
thought to foster self-indulgence and excess. The capacity to define and
enforce limits is a major element of well-being, at the societal level no less
than the personal. Even when free speech promotes checking, compromise,
adaptation, and engagement in the ways specified above, the individual
traits that help to generate those social benefits may simultaneously undercut the project of setting limits. In nurturing such traits as exuberance,
independence, and savvy, free speech sharpens a double-edged sword.
Must freedom cause its practitioners to devalue and defy bounds? The
assertedly natural progression from liberty to license has always figured
prominently in the rhetoric of opposition to free speech. Thoughtful proponents of toleration concede the point. "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing," said Madison in what is the
foundational essay on the meaning of the First Amendment, "and in no
instance is this more true than in that of the press."' Madison thought such
abuses were a price worth paying, but his observations regarding the wisdom
of enduring inevitable excesses were not directed specifically to effects on
character. Licentiousness might be considered especially subversive when
character is the concern.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's much heralded decision in
New York Times Co. v. SuUivan.9 To encourage vigorous criticism of government and thwart efforts by the targets of such criticism to use libel law
to achieve political objectives, the Court construed the First Amendment
to permit recovery by a public official only upon proof that his critic
published the offending statement with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
8.
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions Concerning the Alien and Sedition
Laws, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 229, 259 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed., Brandeis University
Press 1981) (1973).
9.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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disregard for the truth." Perhaps, although there is much dispute about
this, the balance struck by the Court can be justified by a utilitarian
calculation regarding which stories critical of officials ought to reach the
public and which injuries caused thereby warrant legal redress. But the
Sullivan doctrine does more than strike a balance in these terms: It nurtures
a journalistic ethic. Factual inaccuracy is excused and thereby destigmatized; holding a story for further sourcing is discouraged. What is glorified
by the Court is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" reporting." Over
time, we might fear, the immunity from liability established by Sullivan will
adversely affect the character of journalists, weakening resolve to get the
details of a story right. In this environment, even the consumers of critical
stories about public officials might come to care less whether an expos6 is
strictly accurate in its particulars.
The dilemma is apparent. We do need energetic, irreverent, adroit
reporters who are not seduced by the trappings of office or cowed by the
threat of a lawsuit. But we also need reporters who cherish the truth and
appreciate their own fallibility in finding it-reporters, that is, who understand limits. In fostering journalistic aggressiveness and independence, does
Sullivan extract too high a price in the currency of limits? The same question could be asked about a host of other icons in the First Amendment
pantheon, including Mel Nimmer's triumph in Cohen v. California" establishing the right to employ four-letter words in public settings.
As occurs at other junctures in the case for toleration, judgment on
this point depends heavily on one's faith or lack thereof in corrective
dynamics. In my experience, excesses beget reactions. The spectacle of a
person or cause or profession losing all sense of balance and decency tends
to bring home to others the need to reinvigorate the moral and social order,
not least by attending to the character demands of that order. There are
ways to deal with overzealous reporting and breaches of public decorum
other than by invoking the heavy, slow-moving, clumsy artillery of the law.
Informal, nonofficial sanctions and judgments, Milton recognized, will
always provide the most important "bonds and ligaments" that hold a society together.'3 Reporters who take liberties with the truth will be corrected
far more by demanding editors and readers than by libel judgments. Protesters who assault the sensibilities of the public will be reigned in when
their tactics cause audiences to recoil and their opponents to succeed in
discrediting them. Such informal limits are a function of social vitality.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 265-92.
Id. at 270.
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
See MILTON, supra note 3, at 733.
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They depend on dimensions of character that are blunted in repressive
regimes.
It might be argued that the forces of nonofficial correction gain vitality
from regulatory backup. Newspaper editors, for example, could be inspired
to develop rigorous internal standards for fact checking if losing a libel suit
were a more common experience. In theory, there is no reason why the
legal and the informal limits on speech cannot be synergetic. In operation,
however, that phenomenon is more likely to be the exception than the rule.
The content of laws regulating speech cannot help but be affected, in the
direction of weakening the scope and strength of the limits imposed, by
some severe institutional constraints: the risk of ideological bias by judges,
juries, and law enforcement officials; the peculiar difficulty of describing
instances of communication in the categories of legal language; the contingencies that thwart the effort to predict or measure the consequences of
particular acts of expression. Because of those constraints, legal sanctions
can do only a small fraction of the work of setting limits. The informal
sanctions on speech need to be much more substantial, pervasive, finely
calibrated, and subtle than their formal counterparts could ever be. In this
regard, the watered-down limits imposed by the institutionally constrained
legal regime can actually impair the development of robust informal limits
by establishing either a low benchmark or a false perception that meaningful limits are already in place. As a rule, the most effective limits on speech
originate and derive their sustenance from sources other than formal laws.
In part this is so because the limits must themselves be dynamic and
adaptive. The forces of excess do not follow set patterns. The transgressions of investigative reporters assume new forms as technological capacities
expand, competitive pressures intensify, and audiences change. The advent
of cyberspace necessitates the construction of a wholly new type of public
decorum. The accelerating commercialization of American life, not
excluding the life of the mind, raises issues of limits we have barely begun to
address. Limits are not fixed essences to be found and enforced. They are
ongoing judgments, made in response to the novel mix of threats, needs,
and aspirations of a particular time and place. If a free speech tradition does
indeed help citizens to confront problems, retain perspective, and exercise
judgment in a changing environment, in no project are those skills more
valuable than that of enforcing the tacit, uncodified standards of behavior
that make for a resilient social order.
In the last analysis, behind this concern about limits lies the
primordial fear of anarchy. It would be foolish to underestimate the role
this fear has played-and continues to play-in disputes over free speech.
No one with even a passing acquaintance with Hobbes can dismiss the
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threat of anarchy out of hand, or cabin it in the seventeenth century. 4 The
veneer of civilization may be just that.
Anarchy can flow from self-indulgence or zeal but so too can it flow
from the failure to check, or compromise, or adapt, or take responsibility for
social outcomes, or confront evil. What provoked countless persons over
the centuries to fight and sometimes die for the principle of freedom of
speech was, more often than not, a particular form of disorder, something
we might with Locke call anarchy: the unrestrained use of the coercive
apparatus of the state to stamp out difference and hold on to power. 15 The
limits that keep in check the anarchic impulse to wreak vengeance on persons who challenge the reigning orthodoxy are among the essential "bonds
and ligaments" of a civilized society. Those limits depend on constitutional
structures but even more on strength of character.
"IT]he greatest menace to freedom," said Justice Brandeis, "is an inert
people."' 6 He might have added that in a liberal society such a people is
also the greatest menace to order. That is why, for all its costs and excesses,
free speech, the arch-enemy of inertia, is so important.
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